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Abstract 
This paper revisits the empirical trade literature on East West trade in the early 
1990s. Using the estimation technology commonly in use in 1989, I re-estimate 
a simple gravity model for 48 countries using 1988 data covering 88% of world 
trade and 92% of world GDP and find significant barriers to trade both in East 
West trade and against Chinese exports. My estimates that only cover direct 
trade effects and do not include spill-overs and dynamic effects (for example 
on long term growth) indicate that these walls together significantly reduced 
bilateral trade flows. Breaking down those walls according to my calculations 
increased world trade by 20% or 3.6% of world GDP (this amounts to a good 
third of the increase in global trade openness since 1990).  
Typically the trade impact of walls is especially strong at the regional level. 
Comparing the regional impact to the global impact (using trade potential in 
per cent of GDP), I find that the regional impact was 2 to 4 time larger than 
the global impact (the ratios are: Western Europe 1.8, Asia 2.3 and Eastern 
Europe 3.8, respectively). In 1989 the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain exerted a 
much stronger impact than the ‘invisible Chinese wall’ (at the global level about 
15 times as large). This is even true in the Asian trade with China where low 
levels of bilateral trade in 1988 are by and large explained by low levels of 
GDP. This does not mean that this invisible wall was less significant per se, but 
rather that the regional conditions in this particular case in 1988 were such that 
trade would be low both with and without walls. An indication of the potential 
impact of the ‘invisible Chinese wall’ is that its influence in terms of percentage 
trade reduction was stronger in developed but far away markets (in particular 
the Netherlands and the Nordic countries) than in less developed nearby 
markets (such as Malaysia, Thailand and India). This suggests that the ‘invisible 
Chinese wall’ would have started to bite once development in Asia took off.  
In order to check the latter hypothesis I perform a thought experiment 
introducing the visible and invisible walls in a gravity simulation for the world 
trade system in 2008, based on parameter estimates for 1988. I use 2008 
population and GDP data and take account of the break down of a number of 
former Communist countries, shifts in capital cities in Nigeria and Germany 
and the German unification. The relative global impact of the regional walls is 
smaller in the less concentrated context of 2008. Introducing the hypothetical 
‘invisible Chinese wall’, the simulation finds an impact on trade potential of 1% 
of GDP for an invisible Chinese Wall, which is comparable to the 1.5% that I 
find for a hypothetical ‘re-erection’ of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain.  
Keywords 
Walls, East West trade, China, globalisation, economic history. 
5 
 
Acronyms 
BRD Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 
BRIICS Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China, South Africa 
CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
COMECON See CMEA 
DDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany) 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
ICP International Comparisons Project 
OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
USSR Soviet Union 
 
 
6 
 
Visible and invisible walls 
World trade patterns and the end of the Cold War 
1 Introduction 
 
During the Cold War trade at the European continent was substantially 
distorted both by the Communist reliance on self-sufficiency, by the difficulties 
imposed by the East’s lack of hard and convertible currency and by the West 
imposing embargoes on dual use and technologically advanced goods. The fall 
of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain did not only ensure that people could 
travel freely, but also removed political barriers to trade that went far beyond 
the break down of the visible wall between the peoples of East and West 
Europe. Indeed, during a number of years double-digit growth rates 
characterized the trade flows from East to West Europe and from West to 
East (Figure 1; see, for a more detailed picture, Afman and Maurel, 2010).  
Figure 1  
Average real annual growth of trade with OECD (1990-92) 
 
 
Source: OECD (1993), Table 25, p. 122  
 
The break up of a number of formerly communist nations (the USSR, 
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia) into many new nations and the unification of 
the BRD and DDR into the one Germany that we know today complicate the 
analysis, but in general it is clear that the trade between East and West Europe 
(and vice versa) increased many-fold and did so at a pace that was much faster 
than foreseen by optimistic observers in 1990. This paper revisits the empirical 
trade literature on East West trade in the early 1990s in order to find out if 
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trade economists that, on the one hand, competently dealt with the 
consequences of political and diplomatic trade barriers that were associated 
with the very visible Berlin Wall (and Iron Curtain), on the other hand, 
overlooked the consequences of invisible – and more gradual – reductions of 
similar barriers to trade, in particular in the external trade relationships of 
China. 
This paper investigates the issue of the impact of walls in a similar 
framework as the earliest econometric investigation of this issue (van Bergeijk 
and Oldersma 1990) that deals with the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain.1 The 
methodology of this study yields estimates of the trade reducing impact of 
walls and the increase of trade potentials (in per cent of GDP) around the 
globe due to the destruction of these walls. These estimates yield insight into 
the opportunity costs of walls on commercial exchange. 
I move beyond the stage of replication (which in itself is already useful 
since I can use better estimates for Gross Domestic Product than those that 
were readily available in 1990) as I also uncover and illustrate some of the basic 
economics of walls in an empirically relevant context and this provides three 
add-ons. I use the gravity methodology to analyse the impact of another 
politically inspired, but invisible wall, that crumbled in the 1990s, namely the 
diplomatic and political barriers against Chinese exports (see Kaplinsky and 
Messner, 2008, on the broad based integration of China in the global political 
and economic system and Bussière and Schnatz, 2006, for an empirical analysis 
of the advent of China). I also use 2008 data to guesstimate the impact that 
these visible and invisible walls could have exerted in the context of the 
present day trade system. 
The remainder of this working paper is organized as follows. The next 
section sets out the groundwork for the methodology and my analysis as it 
reviews the literature on the impact of the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and 
Iron Curtain that developed in the early 1990s. As will become clear, the 
empirical analyses in the 1990s relied heavily on the so-called gravity analysis. I 
discuss this model and also pay attention to some of the recent applications 
that deal with the impact of invisible trade barriers such as trust and cultural 
and institutional factors. Section 2 sets out the empirical approach and deals 
with data issues. Section 3 discusses the econometric results of a gravity 
equation that uses dummy variables to mimic walls. Section 4 presents the 
results of two simulations that use the gravity parameter estimates for 1988 but 
differ because they are based on data, dyads and distances for 1988 and 2008, 
respectively. Section 5 summarizes the main findings and draws a number of 
methodological lessons that are relevant for research on the economics of walls 
and discusses policy relevance of the findings both with a view to the 1990s 
and for the 2010s. 
                                                 
1 The article appeared earlier in Dutch as ‘Normalisering van het Oost-West 
handelsverkeer,' ESB, 12 december 1989, 74 (Nr. 3737), pp. 1244-6. 
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2 On gravity 
The dramatic political changes that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the 
Iron Curtain inspired many applied trade analyses in the early 1990s. It was 
recognized early on that walls distort economic exchanges between locations 
and therefore the analysis of any wall essentially has to deal with the geography 
of economic activity. The key question on this research agenda was thus: ‘how 
do walls distort the existing network of trade – or prevent the emergence of 
such networks – between agents that are defined by location (in addition to 
other economic characteristics)? A useful research tool to describe the 
geographical patterns of bilateral economic exchange and interaction between 
economic agents is the gravity model.  
The gravity model is most often applied to international bilateral trade and 
investment, but many more applications exist (see van Bergeijk and Brakman 
2010 for the state of the art). The gravity model derives its name from its 
similarity with the Newtonian Law of gravity as the simple and very intuitive 
idea of this model is that economic masses interact stronger if they are large 
and or in close range of one another. Economic gravity rests on an elementary  
concept: bilateral interaction increases in the economic masses of the trade 
partners (approximated by GDP and population) and decreases in the distance 
between the trade partners. This simple idea has now for half a century been 
used to analyse bilateral trade flows with remarkably good statistical 
performance and robust results regarding the main drivers of and obstacles to 
international trade. The model has been out of vogue for some time amongst 
academics because the gravity equation can be derived from any international 
economics theory (and could thus not be used to test which theory is right), 
but actually this kind of theoretical independence is a strong argument for 
applied research especially if it considers long periods and many different 
systems as in the present study. Other strong points include gravity’s ability to 
deal with many ‘empirical regularities’ such as intra-industry trade. This is 
important in view of the international fragmentation of production due to the 
emergence of international value chains. 
All in all, the gravity approach fitted the research questions of one of the 
biggest natural experiments of the 1990s quite well. Breuss and Egger (1999, p. 
82) argue that ‘the opening up of Eastern Europe in 1989 revealed a new field 
of application for the gravity approach’. Also in view of the gravity model’s 
excellent empirical/statistical performance it was no surprise that this model 
became the most important tool to analyse the impact of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the Iron Curtain. 
2.1  Literature of the 1990s 
The most striking reaction amongst Western policy makers to the collapse of 
Communism in 1989 was a common disbelieve in the trade potential of 
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Eastern Europe.2 The popular perception was that the quality of export 
products from Eastern Europe was simply insufficient to meet international 
competition. This perception was built both on the a-typical pattern of 
international specialization that existed in the COMECON and on the low 
volume of trade between East and West (and vice versa). Also the widespread 
inefficiency of production was used to support the argument that exports from 
East Europe could not be competitive on OECD markets. 3 
Still applied trade research showed that major shifts in trade patterns were 
eminent, essentially because these researchers recognized the validity of the key 
concept of comparative advantage, that is that international trade is also 
beneficial for countries that are inefficient in the production of all goods (they 
have absolute disadvantage in all goods). These countries can specialize in the 
good(s) or industry/industries in which they are relatively least inefficient and 
that provides opportunities for mutual beneficial trade. Breaking down walls 
enables this process to start, although much more might be needed in order to 
make real progress. So while it was a priori unknown how long it would take 
before the trade benefits of the breakdown of the Berlin Wall and the Iron 
Curtain would emerge, it was beyond doubt that trade potential increased due 
to the removal of these manmade physical barriers to trade. 
Most researchers (e.g., Havrylyshyn and Pritchett 1991, Wang and Winters 
1991, Döhrn and Milton 1992, Ezran et al. 1992 and Hamilton and Winters 
1992) estimated the gravity model for a large number of countries and used the 
parameters and the observed distances, GDPs and populations to calculate the 
‘normal’ trade levels for each of the CMEA countries. Next, conclusions were 
drawn from the comparison of the actually observed trade flows and the 
‘normal’ or predicted trade flows. In particular the studies predict that a 
turnaround will occur in the geographical pattern of trade: the share of 
Northern Europe in the trade of East Europe would increase from 25%-30% 
to 70%-75%. With hindsight these studies were very helpful for understanding 
and predicting the enormous trade reorientation due to the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (as part of the Iron Curtain’s collapse). One drawback, however, is that 
these studies while rightly indicating the shifts in the relative geographical 
patterns, especially in Europe, did not investigate (or report) the increase in 
global and regional potential trade.  
The procedure in van Bergeijk and Oldersma (1990) differs from the basic 
methodology in the other studies in the 1990s, because it directly estimated the 
impact of the wall by means of a dummy variable rather than deriving the 
impact from a comparison between actual and predicted trade flows as was 
done by most authors. In stead the predicted trade flows were used as the 
starting point for the simulations. By comparing predictions with and 
predictions without the wall, many measurement and interpretation problems 
                                                 
2 Many policy makers thus opted for unrealistic plans to supply Eastern European 
countries with enormous capital injections (see van Bergeijk and Lensink 1993). 
3 In those years it was often asked what kind of products the Eastern European 
countries would be exporting. It took some time before the convincing answer was 
found: ‘non-traditional exports’.  
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could be avoided at the same time arriving at an estimate of changes of trade 
potentials around the globe. 
2.2  Literature on the ‘new’ trade barriers 
It is relevant to review some of the new avenues in the empirical literature 
because this line of research substantiates the idea that ‘unseen walls’ exist and 
that these invisible (at least not directly observable) barriers to trade can exert 
strong impact in the real economy. Of course these manner of barriers have 
always existed, but they remained unobserved because transportation costs 
were exerting a much stronger impact on trade. The substantial reductions in 
the costs of transportation and communication (travel and exchange of ideas) 
in recent decades have removed that veil. Indeed, although the ‘dead of 
distance’ has been claimed many times in the popular press on globalization, a 
persistent finding in the application of gravity models is that distance 
continuous to matter and that the importance of this factor increased in recent 
decades (see the meta-analysis by Disdier and Head 2008). Recent studies 
therefore focus on other forms of distance effects related to indirectly 
observed differences in trust, value systems (cultural norms) and institutional 
quality often uncovering very significant impacts on trade flows (Table 1). The 
message conveyed by Table 1 is that invisible barriers clearly matter. 
TABLE 1  
Impact of a one standard deviation change in intangible trade barriers on exports  
(% change) 
Increase in trust 24–38 a,b,c 
Decrease in cultural diversity      –14–8 a,d,e 
Increase institutional quality 22–45 d 
Source: Adapted from van den Berg et al. (2008), Table 3.6, pp. 37–38. 
Notes: a. Dekker et al. (2006), b. den Butter and Mosch (2003),  
c. Guiso et al. (2004), d. Linders et al. (2005), e. Lankhuizen et al. (2008) 
 
A second more recent strand of literature that is relevant for the issue of 
invisible, politically inspired barriers to trade deals with the impact of economic 
diplomacy (negative and positive political interactions between countries). This 
literature was pioneered in the 1980s and 1990s and at that time it studied so 
called events data and intensively used gravity models (see van Bergeijk 1994, 
Chapter 2 for a detailed review of that literature). In the mid-2000s the topic 
returned on the research agenda again but was more focused on concrete 
structures (such as the network of embassies and consulates) and activities 
(such as state visits). Again most analyses used gravity as a basic concept. 
Moons and van Bergeijk (2011) provide a meta-analysis of 24 studies covering 
both the early and the recent studies finding that diplomacy exerts a strong 
impact on trade. 
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3 Empirical design and data issues 
The empirical design deploys the basic equation of van Bergeijk and Oldersma 
(1990), Wang and Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1992) who all 
relate exports to GDPs, populations and distance. Using this traditional form, I 
estimate cross country a gravity model for the global pattern of bilateral trade 
from 1988 data in which politically induced distortions in the bilateral Chinese 
and East-West trade flows are included: 
  
lnEij = c+αlnYi +βlnYj +γ lnDij +δlnNi +ζ lnNj + ηdumEWWE + θdumChina  +  
 
Where Eij   = exports of country i to country j 
Yx   = GDP country x 
Nx   = population of country x 
Dij   = distance between capitals of country i and j 
dumEWWE = dummy variable for trade between East and West  
dumChina  = dummy variable for trade by and with China 
  = error term 
 
Due to the logarithmic transformation the model cannot handle zero 
flows (no bilateral trade) and therefore an arbitrary linear transformation was 
performed adding the threshold value ($0.5 million) to all export flows (as in 
van Bergeijk and Oldersma 1990). Compared to most studies in the field, the 
zero flow problem is limited in my dataset (65 flows or 3% of the 2162 
observations) and, moreover, the problem is concentrated in Africa which 
covers 82% of the zero trade flows (in particular half the zero trade cases 
involve South Africa, due to official sanctions and consumer boycotts against 
Apartheid). Anyhow, as Africa is not of major concern in the simulation 
exercises, the zero flow issue is of limited relevance for my research.  
Many explanatory variables could be added to this equation (as is common 
practice in most gravity analyses). I am, however, interested in simulations for 
1988 and 2008 and only need a reasonably good approximation for the key 
determinants of the network of world trade. For that reason I want to focus on 
geography (distance) and on the time variant variables GDP and population. 
(Similarity of languages, for example, will not change during the simulations.) 
Importantly, one of the most commonly applied explanatory variables 
(adjacency or a common border between nations) is problematic in my 
investigation because this would cause problems with the German unification 
(Poland and Hungary, for example, become Germany’s neighbour in addition 
to the disappearance of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain so that it would be 
difficult to logically distinguish the contributions of adjacency and wall). 
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Country coverage 
The country coverage is almost the same selection as the one that was 
originally made in 1990 guided by the considerations to cover the most 
important trading nations, all continents, different economic systems and levels 
of development. With hindsight that selection was rather lucky since almost all 
G20 countries are on board, in particular the country group known as the 
BRIICS (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China and South Africa) and this is of 
course important in view of the relevance of the simulation for 2008. 
The country sample covers: Algeria, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
BRD, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia*, DDR*, Denmark, Egypt, 
Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South-Africa, South-
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, USA, 
USSR*/Russia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia*.4 
Trade 
Clearly a dataset that deals with history needs to take into account that 
countries disappeared since the 1990s. In addition since I want to study the 
invisible Chinese wall, I want to include Taiwan for obvious reasons. These 
requirements imply that I cannot use data sources that only use countries that 
are identified in the last ISO country list (as for example is the case with the 
Head and Mayer dataset that is available from CEPII) or that have to be 
politically correct and thus exclude Taiwan (such as trade data sets provided by 
the international organizations). For these reasons I use Gleditsch’s  
comprehensive trade data set although it does not provide data on Hong Kong 
(available at  http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/exptradegdp.html; see also 
Gleditsch 2002). The trade data relate to 1988 exports. 
GDP and population 
I rely on Maddison’s historical series for population in 1000s and GDP per 
capita (in millions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars). Van Bergeijk 
and Oldersma (1990) use PPP data form the International Comparisons 
Project, but I prefer Maddison’s data for three reasons.5 First, Maddison’s 
benchmark year is closer to the year of observation for the data (1990 versus 
1985 or 1996 for the ICP). Second, my model relates to GDP and international 
trade and thus is best served by a method that does not correct for differences 
in purchasing power due to different prices for non traded goods as is done in 
the ICP. Third ICP uses procedures to ensure consistency of levels at 
                                                 
4 The countries that were included in the regression for 1988, but not in the 
simulation for 2008, are indicated by an asterisk. 
5 The choice for Maddison’s data rather than the ICP data that were used originally in 
van Bergeijk and Oldersma (1990) also reflects that the developments of countries 
that do no longer exist are not reported in recent vintages of the Penn World Tables. 
13 
 
benchmark years and growth rates between benchmark years. I am not 
interested in growth rates of GDP but at GDP levels at a specific point in time 
that is close to Maddison’s benchmark. Hence the choice for the data set of 
Angus Maddison’s Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-
2008 AD. This source is also known as “Maddison’s historical series” and is 
available from the website of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre 
www.ggdc.net. Although this dataset provides data for communist states and 
there derivatives and successor states in case of collapse of a nation, Maddison 
does not provide the data for DDR and BRD but simply seems to have 
aggregated them into one number for ‘Germany’. Luckily his 1995 study (pp. 
130-132) provides details on his treatment of the Germanies so that I can 
reconstruct the data for BRD and DDR in 1988.  
The data for 2008 are straight forwardly derived from his historical series. 
Distance 
I measure distance as the crow flies using basic geometrics. Distances are 
calculated from the degrees of longitude and latitude of the capital cities of the 
trade partners in 1988. In the counterfactual simulation I take care of changes 
in the capitals of Nigeria and Germany between 1988 and 2008.  
Assume the Earth to be a perfect sphere with a circumference of 40,000 
kilometers. The coordinates of a point on the unit sphere are  
 
x = sinθ × cosφ,   
y =sinθ × sinφ and   
z = cosθ,  
 
where θ is the normalized latitude 0 < θ < π and φ is the normalized longitude 
0 < φ < 2π. The angle α between the vectors a = [x, y, z] and a’= [x’, y’, z’] can 
be obtained from cos α = a × a’ and α < π. The shortest distance between the 
two points over the surface of the globe is roughly 20,000α/π. 
Walls 
My walls are not made of bricks and mortar but are dummy variables that 
assume the value 1 if countries are on opposite sides of the wall and 0 if they 
are on the same side of the wall. I let the data decide about the strength of the 
wall: the estimated coefficients for this dummy provide an indication of both 
the statistical significance and the economic importance of the wall. 
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4 Econometric results 
The econometric results for the gravity equation are reported in the second 
column of Table 2. The model performs quite well in statistical terms as it 
explains about two thirds of the variance and has highly significant coefficients  
(the dummy for trade to and from China is, however, only significant at the 
90% confidence level). For comparison the results of van Bergeijk and 
Oldersma, 1990, are reported in the first column of Table 2. Typically, the sign, 
size and significance of the 1990 study are quite well replicated for another year 
(1988 versus 1985), a slightly different set of countries (I leave Iceland out 
because I do not have comparable data on its GDP and Hong Kong is 
integrated in the Chinese trade statistics in the 1988 trade data base that I use 
and for that reason drops out) and for a different source for GDP and 
population. This robustness further increases the confidence in the 
econometric findings. 
TABLE 2  
OLS estimates for bilateral trade flows countries  
(49 countries in 1985 and 48 countries in 1988) 
 Van Bergeijk and 
Oldersma 1990 
(1) 
Replication 
(present study) 
(2) 
Based on data for 1985 1988 
GNP Exporter 1.8 1.6 
 (36.9) (37.4) 
GNP Importer 1.3 1.4 
 (22.9) (31.2) 
Population Exporter -1.0 -0.9 
 (-19.8) (-23.4) 
Population Importer 
 
-0.6 
(-12.1) 
-0.6 
(16.8) 
Distance 
 
-1.0 
(30.6) 
-0.9 
(-28.7) 
Trade from and/or to 
East (dummy) 
-2.1 
(-29.8) 
-1.4 
(-20.6) 
Trade from and/or to 
China (dummy) 
 -0.3 
(-1.6) 
Constant -3.8 -8.7 
 (-18.7) (16.2) 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.66 
F 718 592 
(t-values in brackets) 
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5 Simulation results 
The next step is to use actual observations for explanatory variables and 
estimated parameters to simulate the expected trade patterns. (Note that the 
constant term reported in Table 2 cannot be used in this calculation due to the 
logarithmic transformation of the original model and has to be derived from 
the necessary equality of observed total trade and predicted total trade.) The 
only purpose of the expected trade matrix is to serve as the basis for the 
scenarios. So it can (and does) deviate from the observed trade matrix, but the 
ranking of trading nations and trading partners is grosso modo the same for 
observations and predictions and in this sense we have a reasonable good 
description of the world trade system to start with. 
5.1 Impact of visible and invisible walls in 1988 
The first scenario to be investigated concerns the consequences of breaking 
down the visible wall between East and West Europe (that is setting dumEWWEij 
= 0 for all i and j) and the invisible wall surrounding China (so θdumChina  becomes 
0 for all i and j). My estimates that only cover direct trade effects and do not 
include spill-overs and dynamic effects (for example on long term growth) 
indicate that these walls together significantly reduced bilateral trade flows. 
Breaking down those walls according to my calculations increased world trade 
by 20% or 3.5% of world GDP (that is a good third of the increase in global 
trade openness since 1990).  
TABLE 3  
Simulation of the impact of walls based on 1988 data constellation 
 
Berlin Wall
(1) 
Chinese wall
(2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2) 
Africa  0.6%  0.0%  20 
Asia  0.4%  0.4%  1 
Australia, New Zealand  0.8%  0.1%  6 
E‐Europe and USSR  12.3%  0.1%  183 
Latin America  0.4%  0.0%  12 
Middle East  2.1%  0.1%  26 
N‐America  1.0%  0.1%  13 
W‐Europe  5.5%  0.1%  42 
World  3.3%  0.2%  19 
 
Typically the trade impact is especially strong at the regional level. Comparing 
the regional impact to the global impact (using trade potential in per cent of 
GDP), I find that the regional impact was 2 to 4 time larger than the global 
impact (the ratios are: Western Europe 1.8, Asia 2.3 and Eastern Europe 3.8, 
respectively). The Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain exerted a much stronger impact 
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than the ‘invisible Chinese wall’ (at the global level about 15 times as large). 
This is even true for the Asian trade with China. 
Based on these findings it is fair to conclude that the economic context at 
the time of the break down of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain was such 
that it was unreasonable to assume big changes in world trade due to the 
changes that were taking place in China. Although significant in a statistical 
sense, its economic significance seemed to be of second order only. 
5.2 2008 counter factual 
The findings for 1988 do not necessarily mean that the removal of the invisible 
Chinese wall is less significant from a historic perspective. Indeed, it is 
probable that the regional conditions in this particular case in 1989 were such 
that trade would be low both with and without walls. Walls cannot distort 
economic non-activity.6 An indication, however, of the potential impact of the 
‘invisible Chinese wall’ is that its influence in terms of percentage trade 
reduction was stronger in developed but far away markets (in particular the 
Netherlands and the Nordic countries) than in less developed nearby markets 
(such as Malaysia, Thailand and India). This suggests that the ‘invisible Chinese 
wall’ would have started to bite once development in Asia took off.  
In order to check the latter hypothesis I perform a second simulation 
based on a thought experiment by introducing the visible and invisible walls in 
a gravity simulation for the world trade system in 2008, based on parameter 
estimates for 1988. I use 2008 population and GDP data and take account of 
the break down of a number of formerly Communist countries, shifts in capital 
cities and the German unification. In particular I exclude Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia, the West and East Germanies are unified and capitals are relocated 
from Bonn to Berlin and from Lagos to Abuja. 
TABLE 4  
Simulation of the impact of walls based on 2008 data constellation 
Berlin Wall
(1) 
Chinese Wall
(2) 
Ratio 
(1)/(2) 
Africa  0,3%  0,1%  2 
Asia  0,2%  1,8%  0,1 
Australia and New Zealand  0,5%  0,8%  0,6 
E‐Europe and Russia  14,1%  0,3%  46 
Latin America  0,2%  0,2%  1,3 
Middle East  1,1%  0,4%  3 
N‐America  0,6%  0,4%  1,3 
W‐Europe  3,4%  0,8%  4 
World  1,5%  1,0%  1,5 
                                                 
6 By implication: a wall that does not bite yet, is difficult to detect in economic 
statistics. 
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As before I start from the predicted trade pattern (but this time the 
starting point is of course the situation without walls, as that is the 2008 case) 
that I calculate from the 2008 observations but using the gravity model’s 
parameter estimates for 1988. Next I so to say ‘switch on’ the wall dummies 
and analyse how the predicted trade flows change (Table 4). 
 
The global impact of the regional walls in combination is at the world level 
a third smaller in the less concentrated context of 2008, even though at the 
regional level impacts increase in Asia and Eastern Europe. A hypothetical 
‘invisible Chinese wall’ could reduce world trade by about 1% of world GDP, 
which is comparable to the 1.5% that I find for a hypothetical ‘re-erection’ of 
the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain. At the world level the trade potential 
reduction (2.5% of GDP) of the walls in 2008 can be compared to the 3.5% in 
1988. 
Figure 2  
Actual and predicted shares in world trade in 1988 and 2008 
 
In order to give some idea regarding the issue whether the model is on 
track, Figure 2 compares actual and predicted shares in world trade (I use the 
total trade of the countries in this study as the denominator). The modelling 
exercise over-predicts American and European trade shares and under-predicts 
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the share of Asia both in 1988 and in 2008.7 However, comparing the 
predictions we can see that they move into the right direction that is from the 
predicted trade pattern in 1988 towards the observed trade pattern in 2008. All 
in all the predictions are rough rather than precise but also seem to give a 
reasonably good idea of the orders of magnitude involved. 
The second thought experiment is of course much more speculative, but 
one should not forget that the idea of almost full trade integration in a few 
years time also was considered to be highly speculative in 1989.8  Admittedly, a 
wall in Europe is much more difficult to conceive as it was before 1961 when 
the Berlin Wall was erected, but at the same time one is aware that it is in the 
present geopolitical context not difficult to imagine a political conflict that 
would create significant barriers in the trade relations with China. In this sense 
a seemingly unlikely scenario may ultimately not be unrealistic. The simulations 
indicate that the impact of walls depends on local conditions on both sides of 
the wall.  
6 Discussion and conclusions 
The results in the previous section should not be seen as accurate predictions 
(cf. Breuss and Egger 1999), but rather as a serious attempt to uncover the size 
of the potential impact of a wall that played a major role in recent history. We 
know from observation that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain led 
to an enormous surge in intra European trade. This observation and the fact 
that this trade potential was ex ante indicated by a number of gravity analyses in 
the 1990s motivated a revisit of the empirical trade literature on East West 
trade in order to find out if trade economists that, on the one hand, 
competently dealt with the consequences of political and diplomatic trade 
barriers that were associated with the very visible Berlin Wall (and Iron 
Curtain), on the other hand, might have overlooked the consequences of 
invisible – and more gradual – reductions of similar barriers to trade, in 
particular in the external trade relationships of China.  
In view of the findings in this working paper, the signals that important 
change was eminent in China’s trade were weak at most. An interesting finding 
                                                 
7 Note that an alterative interpretation exists for the excess of actual over predicted 
values in 2008 as this has been interpreted as an indication of the trade creating impact 
of the removal of trade barriers (Erzan et al., 1992). In Asia and East Europe trade 
creation occurs; in West Europe the fall of the wall yields trade diversion, that is a 
reallocation of trade to East Europe at the expense of non European countries. A 
possible interpretation of the latter is that this is a result of the fact that the Eastern 
European countries have joined the European Union. 
8 Actually, we met so much resistance with our 1990 research that we felt obliged to 
include the qualifier that it could take ‘some decades before the potential trade 
increases fully materialize’ (van Bergeijk and Oldersma 1990, p. 604). In the same 
sense Smith (1992, p. 109) while supporting the appropriateness of the gravity 
approach notes ‘though, of course, only the next two decades will show whether this 
confidence is well-founded’. 
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is that the costs of the visible and invisible walls in 1988 relative to world GDP 
exceed the impact that can reasonably be expected in the 2008 context (even 
though the impact is locally stronger in Asia and Eastern Europe), because of 
the fragmentation of world production and the reduced concentration in trade 
(Figure 3)  
Figure 3  
Trade potential impact of walls (per cent of GDP, 1988 and 2008 data) 
 
 
 
The empirical analysis of the world trade system just before the end of the 
Cold War provides some useful numerical illustrations of general patterns 
regarding the economic impact of walls. First, walls are not mirrors. The 
economics of walls should consider the possibility of asymmetries, in particular 
because the costs of walls and the benefits of their removal can be distributed 
quite unevenly between the two sides of the wall. Second, the two simulations 
clarify that the impact of walls depends on local conditions on both sides of 
the wall, but also on the opportunities that exist for economic interaction with 
and between entities in wall-free locations. Third, while walls do not disturb 
economic non-activity (or very low levels of activity), they may still act as 
potential economic distortions that become evident only once economic 
development sets in. Fourth, although the impact of walls is obviously the 
strongest the closest one is to the wall, their impact beyond the local level will 
often be not negligible. 
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